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This paper addresses a simple, and largely empirical, research question: 
is the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) recent high level 
commitment to reducing inequality translated into concrete action in its 
dealings with member states?  Addressing this research question is 
significant in several respects. First, the high level rhetorical commitment 
to reduce inequality might be seen as paradoxical because the IMF, 
alongside other institutions of global economic management, has long 
been criticised for its role in promoting economic reform in member 
countries, partly on the basis that this increases inequality (Peet et al. 
2009; Kentikelenis et al. 2016: 550-1).  It is therefore important to assess 
the extent to which recent pronouncements on inequality by the Fund 
suggest a change in emphasis or a genuine institutional commitment. 
Second, addressing the question contributes to a contemporary academic 
literature on more technical aspects of how we should understand and 
interpret IMF policy advice and conditionality.  This literature currently 
focusses on a range of aspects of IMF policy advice, but does not address 
the recent interest of the Fund in inequality. The paper addresses this 
lacuna. 
Our focus on inequality complements several strands of investigation in 
the existing literature on the IMF, particularly a variety of recent studies 
which assess the extent to which the Fund’s practice and ideas have 
shifted since the financial crisis that started in 2007 (e.g. Park and 
Vetterlein 2010). Much of this existing research focuses on fiscal and 
financial policy (see Ban and Gallagher 2015).  Our focus is in some 
ways broader; seeking to locate IMF practice not just in the post-crisis 
context but in the deeper historical process of world market expansion. It 
is also in some ways more specific: styudying IMF policy and practice 
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specifically in relation to income and wealth inequality within countries.  
We argue that there is evidence of change in the orientation of the IMF 
but that this has not fully percolated down into IMF practice in relation to 
the policy advice it dispenses to its member states.  Similar to 
Kentikelenis et al. (2016: 565) in relation to labour and social protection 
issues, we find that there is evidence that the IMF’s commitment to 
inequality “reflects more ‘talk’ than ‘walk’”. 
The paper proceeds in the following way.  The first section reviews and 
contextualises the IMF’s recent statements on inequality as one of several 
notable institutions to take up this concern. It is suggested that one 
possible explanation for this is that these international organisations are 
engaged increasingly in risk management; focussed on their shared 
agenda of promoting and sustaining world market integration.  In that 
context, increasing inequality is now being seen, not merely as an 
unfortunate consequence of that shared agenda, but as a risk to it.  The 
second section reviews the recent literature focussing more specifically 
on IMF policy advice, drawing from that a series of more detailed ways 
in which the central research question for the paper might be addressed. 
The empirical strategies found in some of this literature are used to shape 
the way in which data is collected and interpreted.  The third section 
briefly summarises the empirical data collection and analysis process 
undertaken.  The fourth section presents the results of this multi-stage 
process to chart the IMF’s commitment to reduce inequality. It includes a 
review of high level policy documents and speeches, recent changes to 
the operational guidance that shapes the work of IMF staff and an 
analysis of the changing policy advice that the IMF officially offers to its 
member states.  The consistency (or lack of it) of the IMF’s commitment 
to reducing inequality – in its own terms – through these different 
institutional scales is then used to answer the central empirical research 
question.  The final section of the paper discusses how these empirical 
findings may be interpreted as a contribution to the broader ‘Critical’ 
International Political Economy (IPE) literature and suggests avenues for 
further research which are consistent with JAPE’s commitment to critical 
and pluralistic scholarship (Stilwell 2015).1 
                                                 
1 Here we note the debate in JAPE over whether there are grounds for fruitful engagement 
between heterodox political economy and ‘International Political Economy’ (e.g. Chester 
and Schroeder 2015) but assert that our contribution is consistent with this critique and is 
located within the ‘Critical’ IPE tradition, for example as outlined by Shields et al. (2011). 
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Context and Background 
It has been known for some time that socio-economic (income and 
wealth) inequality has been increasing within many countries, 
accentuating global inequality, while aggregate inequalities between 
states have been narrowing.  Moreover, in many countries gender 
inequalities have also narrowed (though by no means disappeared).  The 
OECD has tracked increasing income and wealth inequalities within 
countries for some time, noting large upward shifts in the gini-coefficient 
in most of its member states between the mid 1980s and mid-2000s 
(OECD 2011).  Anthony Atkinson and Thomas Piketty (2007) and many 
other political economists (Stillwell and Jordan 2007) have long-been 
significant in highlighting the role of very high earners in shaping this 
shift, but it is Piketty’s (2014) post-crisis book Capital in the 21st Century 
and Oxfam’s high profile ‘Even it Up’2 campaign which have really 
caught the political mood.  Indeed, a ‘new politics of inequality’ might be 
emerging (Nunn 2015).  While similar arguments can be made about the 
ways in which gender inequality has been treated by significant 
international institutions (e.g. see Elias 2013; Bedford 2009), the focus in 
this paper is broadly the increased inequality between households in 
terms of income and wealth that is reported in many countries 
internationally (Milanovic 2016). 
There is some evidence of a ‘new global politics of inequality’ emerging 
(Nunn 2015). The terms of this new global politics of inequality are two-
fold; consisting of both bottom-up and top-down dynamics.  From the 
bottom-up, rising inequality, the effects of the global economic crisis of 
2008 onwards and state responses to it, have released a wave of protests 
and new political movements at both ends of the political spectrum.  For 
example, trends as diverse as the election of Jeremy Corbyn to lead the 
Labour Party, the electoral attraction of UKIP3 and the ‘Brexit’ 
referendum vote in the UK, to popular protests against austerity in 
Greece and the formation of Syriza and Golden Dawn as rival political 
alliances, the emergence of the Five Star movement in Italy, AfD in 
                                                 
2 See for e.g. https://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/even-it-up. 
3 UKIP is the popular acronym for the UK Independence Party who have gained electoral 
support in recent years in the UK but even more than their electoral support they have been 
influential in shaping UK public opinion in relation to the European Union. 
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Germany, the election of Donald Trump in the US and various protest 
movements in Spain, Turkey and Latin America can all be read partly in 
this way.  While there are clearly very different proximate causes for 
these developments in different countries, dissatisfaction with high or 
rising inequality, resulting insecurity and other consequences can be read 
as one potential unifying theme. 
From the top-down, international organisations, and global fora for 
business and policy elites, have responded to these movements by 
developing a new-found interest in inequality. A previous paper (Nunn 
2015) argued that these concerns with inequality can be thought of in 
terms of systemic risk.  International organisations have placed 
increasing emphasis in recent years on risk management.  Discussing this 
focus on risk management, Cammack (2012) distinguishes between 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ risks.  He argues that the former category are 
those risks deemed necessary as part of the process of world market 
integration and the latter is about risks to that process such as natural 
disasters or financial crises with systemic significance.  In an expanding 
world market nearing completion, a range of these risks may become 
significantly amplified in scale and significance (Jessop 2015; Peet 
2011).  Crisis tendencies in capitalist development could be offset in the 
post-World War II and then post-cold war system through spatial 
expansion of the system (Harvey 1982: Chapter 13).  As the spatial limits 
of that process loom into view, the prospect of further ‘spatial fixes’ 
become more limited and attendant risks take on a more systemic nature.  
In that context, a variety of international organisations including the 
World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and, in a different fashion, the World 
Economic Forum are increasingly focussed on the need to undertake 
systemic risk management. The new found interest of these international 
organisations in tackling the rising inequality that the take-up of their 
policy advice helped to create, might therefore be interpreted in these 
terms.  In the ‘post-crisis’ landscape, inequality is seen as an emergent 
risk to the sustainability of world market expansion. 
That different International Organisations (IOs) have converged on a 
similar understanding of inequality is itself of interest.  Robert Cox 
famously characterized this consensus across different institutions as a 
‘nebulueuse’ (Cox 1992), though that somewhat under-explains the 
social constitution of these shared positions as a product of material 
struggle (Bonefeld 2006: 48), in which these international organisations 
are conscious and influential actors. In the context of this paper, the 
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social constitution and political economy content of this agency is 
revealed by the prominence that IOs now give to inequality as a risk to 
the smooth sustainability of world market expansion.  Ideas about how to 
best manage their shared agenda of world market expansion flow 
between, and are sometimes contested within and between, these 
organisations.  The World Bank’s adoption of poverty reduction as a 
mantra in the 1990s in contrast to the IMF’s more orthodox neo-liberal 
position is a case in point. But given their shared agenda and the 
interchange of ideas and information between them, it is no surprise that 
these organisations often alight on shared analyses of attendant risks to 
their objectives and develop shared agendas for addressing them. 
Of course, these IOs operate with different levels and types of agency, 
sometimes more focussed on shaping available ideational structures to 
justify domestic policy development, and at other times operating with 
clearer material leverage over domestic policies.  In either case, these 
ideational frameworks arise from the material processes of world market 
expansion, and have resulting material consequences for that process.  
Managing inequality as risk is, then, both an ideational and a material 
process at the same time, and the division of labour between and within 
IOs reflects their different contributions to the risk management process. 
Among IOs, the OECD has played an important leading role in 
identifying inequality as a risk to world market expansion. The 
organisation has long emphasised the benefits of risk management and its 
post-crisis New Approaches to Economic Challenges project is 
constructed around the ways in which climate change, resource 
depletion, political instability and inequality might threaten the stability 
of world market integration. The notion underpinning the project is that 
‘discredited’ and narrow economic thinking is a barrier to identifying and 
coping with these risks. The OECD has also led the way in identifying 
inequality as an emergent systemic risk.  While there is a long track 
record of some marginal or less celebrated publications from the OECD, 
and OECD staff, on inequality under neo-liberal reform (e.g. Atkinson et 
al. 1995), the issue became much more prominent for the organisation in 
the mid 2000s, especially (but not only) with the release of the high 
profile Growing Unequal (d’ Addio 2007; Förster and d’ Ercole 2005; 
OECD 2008).  Growing Unequal had accepted that inequality was an 
issue that member states increasingly needed to address.  In a number of 
publications from 2011 onwards, the OECD appears to take an 
increasingly radical stance on inequality.  The (2011) report Divided We 
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Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising is a serious book-length attempt to 
understand inequality and the causes of its increase in most OECD 
countries. First, noting this increase, the report opens with the statement 
that ‘inequality has become a universal concern, among both policy 
makers and societies at large’ (17) and it quickly marks out why this is 
so: 
The economic crisis has added urgency to deal with the policy issues 
related to inequality. The social compact is starting to unravel in many 
countries. Young people who see no future for themselves feel 
increasingly disenfranchised. They have now been joined by 
protesters who believe that they are bearing the brunt of a crisis for 
which they have no responsibility, while people on high incomes 
appear to have been spared. From Spain to Israel, from Wall Street to 
Syntagma Square, popular discontent is spreading rapidly. Due to the 
crisis, uncertainty and inequality-related issues have reached the 
middle classes in many societies. (OECD 2011: 17). 
Underlining the emphasis now being given to inequality as a risk by the 
OECD Secretary General, Angel Gurria (2013) comments that:  
The benefits of growth have not trickled down. Income inequalities 
have become one of the biggest global challenges, attracting growing 
attention not only in academic literature but also among policymakers 
globally. The world community is increasingly highlighting the 
pernicious influence of inequalities on social stability and 
development outcomes. High levels of inequality generate high costs 
for society, dampening social mobility, undermining the labour market 
prospects of vulnerable social groups, and creating social unrest. 
So the renewed emphasis to be given to inequality is not just the result of 
knowledge that inequality is rising, for that was known already.  Rather, 
the effect of inequality as a cause of social and political unrest is central 
to understanding this renewed interest.  Published work on inequality 
coming out of the OECD has since gathered steam. Research and policy 
publications focus on explanations for the declining labour share of GDP 
(Bassanini and Manfredi 2012), widening income inequalities post-crisis 
and into the future (OECD 2013 2014a 2014b) and that inequality may 
undermine economic growth (Causa et al. 2015; Cingano 2014). This 
analysis underpins the OECD’s adoption of the mantra of ‘inclusive 
growth’ as a tool to “create economies where every citizen, regardless of 
income, wealth, gender, race or origin is empowered to succeed” (Angel 
Gurria, Foreword to Keely 2015: 3).  That ‘inclusive growth’ has now 
been taken up as a policy idea by other international organisations (e.g. 
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World Bank, UNDP, EU, Asian Development Bank) exemplifies the 
point made here about shared agendas and the inter-penetration of ideas. 
The World Bank’s (2014) World Development Report: Risk and 
Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development is also illustrative of this 
risk management emphasis.  The report outlines the benefits that can 
come from a risk management approach that promotes ‘positive’ risk 
taking but controls for the effects of ‘negative risks’ at a range of 
different scales.  The distinctive contribution that can be played by 
international organisations, such as the Bank, at the scale of the 
international community is precisely the identification of systemic risks 
that might result from world market integration and overwhelm the 
capacity of individual states and groups of states. 
Since 2010 the IMF has also taken up the concern with inequality and the 
organisation has published a range of reports on the subject and even has 
a dedicated website focussed on the topic.4 IMF publications make a 
strong empirical case for the relationship between increasing income 
inequality in the US, the rise of precarious household indebtedness, 
financial sector vulnerability and crisis (Kumhof & Ranciere 2010). In 
Redistribution, Inequality and Growth, released with some fanfare in 
March 2014, Ostry et al. (2014) argue that greater original and net 
equality are positive for growth and that greater inequality reduces 
growth potential in multiple ways, including declining political and 
social consensus, and stability. The report pays particular attention to the 
role of inequality in stimulating public opinion in support of more 
redistribution, suggesting at least a partial concern for political stability. 
The IMF Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality (IMF 2014a) 
presents a detailed review of the effects of various fiscal and social 
policies on inequality, with the conclusion that inequality, like poverty, 
can be bad for growth (for a discussion see Obeng-Odoom 2016: 134-5); 
thereby presenting a risk to the expansive character of the world market.  
Interviews with senior IMF staff5 in both policy and research 
departments suggest that the Fund is fully committed to a new global 
                                                 
4 http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/inequality/ 
5 Interviews were undertaken by the authors with two senior representatives of the IMF in 
relation to policy and research.  These followed a semi-structured topic guide focussed on 
explaining the production of high profile recent publications on inequality (see Findings 
section).  Both respondents have been connected with the Fund’s work on inequality and 
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politics of inequality.  They pointed to the Executive Board Work 
Programme for 2014, which includes a section on inequality, committing 
Fund staff to examine the ‘interplay between financial inclusion, growth, 
inequality, and financial stability in emerging and developing countries’ 
and to ‘operationalize the Fund’s recent analytical work on inequality’ in 
Article IV discussions with member states and to expand this work on 
inequality in relation to ‘Jobs and Growth’ (IMF 2014c).  The 
interviewees also argued that inequality can be regarded in both positive 
and negative terms in relation to the objectives of the Fund.  ‘Good’ 
inequality can drive positive risk taking, innovation and growth, with 
China cited as an example of this.  ‘Bad’ inequality can undermine 
growth, leading to fragility and creating political and social instability.  
The point at which ‘good’ becomes ‘bad’ inequality, however, is not a 
measurable benchmark but one of social and political struggle inside any 
one society. 
Interestingly, interview responses suggested that while the Fund had a 
long-term interest in inequality as a result of the social and political 
consequences from early structural adjustment programmes from the 
early 1980s onwards,6 the more recent intensification of this interest was 
triggered by the unrest of the Occupy movement and Arab Spring in 
2010/11.  The interviewees suggested that in responding to this, the focus 
of the Fund has been shaped by its Mandate to concentrate not on 
internal political issues and structural policy, but on macro-economic 
policy.  So while socio-political risks associated with inequality are fully 
recognised, most of the content of the Fund’s key publications and its 
new Work Programme are shaped by the connection identified by Ostry 
(and colleagues), Rajan, Kumhoff and Ranciere in relation to inequality, 
growth and macro-economic (in)stability (IMF 2014b, 2014c).  The Fund 
interviewees suggested that in this regard they saw themselves working 
alongside the OECD (in rich countries) and the World Bank (in 
Developing Countries) whose formal responsibilities more closely align 
with domestic structural reform. 
                                                                                                   
both had long track records in senior positions at the Fund. The interviews were undertaken 
at the Fund’s Headquarters in Washington DC in November 2014. 
6 See (IMF 2014a) for details of the assertion that the Fund has a longer interest in 
inequality charting back to experience with Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 
1980s, the issue of new Staff guidance in the 1990s on income distribution and several 
important publications in the early 2000s.  
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The high level political and rhetorical commitment to tackling inequality 
has also been repeatedly emphasised by the IMF Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde.  For instance, speaking at a World Economic Forum 
debate on inequality in early 2015, she remarked triumphantly that she 
had moved “the IMF in the direction of looking at inequality as 
mainstream and core business” (Lagarde 2015). Similarly, a further high 
level IMF report during 2015 continued to frame inequality as one of the 
most significant policy challenges facing the international community: 
…Widening income inequality is the defining challenge of our time…. 
The economic and social fallout from the global financial crisis and 
the resultant headwinds to global growth and employment have 
heightened the attention to rising income inequality… (Dabla-Norris 
et al. 2015). 
Taken as a whole, the discussion in this section might lend emphasis to 
the suggestion that there is a new politics of inequality emerging among 
global elites concerned with managing the process of world market 
integration. The significance of this ‘new politics’ can be taken to be the 
apparent shift in emphasis away from a relaxed neo-liberal attitude to 
inequality on the grounds that this is less important than growth and 
combatting absolute poverty, toward a concern with the negative effects 
of inequality on growth, political and financial stability. Such a concern 
can be interpreted not so much as a Damascene conversion to 
egalitarianism, as an attempt to stabilize an expanding and increasingly 
unstable international system suffering intensifying feedback effects from 
socio-economic polarization, problems with absorbing surpluses and 
shifting the costs of devaluation (Nunn 2015; Nunn & Beeckmans 2015).   
This high level rhetorical analysis leaves a number of important 
empirical questions unanswered, such as how seriously this new politics 
of inequality is taken by key institutions.  The IMF is an ideal target for 
research in relation to this because, unlike the World Bank or OECD, its 
membership is near universal and unlike the OECD, it actually has 
mechanisms at its disposal to promote reform within its member states.  
As such, the remainder of the paper focuses on evidence from IMF 
policy advice and conditionality requirements to assess the extent to 
which high level rhetorical commitments to reduce inequality are 
actually transferred to member states. 
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Recent Literature on the Changing Policy Advice of the 
IMF 
IMF policy advice has long been a controversial subject.  Though it was 
initially intended to offer only economic and not political advice, 
research shows that IMF policy advice has increased in its expansiveness 
and in controversy over a long period of time, and at least since the 
1960s (Best 2012: 675).  Criticism reached a particular high point in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s when policy advice was arguably at its most 
prescriptive, expansive and detailed (Boughton 2012: Chapter 4), and 
also when popular protest became more prominent, for example when the 
IMF was among a number of institutions attacked by violent protests, as 
well as more peaceful NGO and social movement campaigns to ‘Make 
Poverty History’ and ‘Drop the Debt’. 
At about this time, the Fund was also criticised for its handling of the 
East Asian financial crisis (Babb 2013: 282; Best 2012: 684).  Like the 
debt and poverty campaigns, this criticism was notable because it was 
put forward by relatively sober and mainstream figures who had 
previously supported market oriented reform such as Jeffrey Sachs.  
Joseph Stiglitz – who was then Chief Economist of the World Bank – 
was one of those critics and his book Globalisation and its Discontents 
(Stiglitz 2002), might have been better labelled ‘The IMF and its 
Discontents’.  The book was well received among those critical of the 
wider political economy of structural adjustment, and, for a time, there 
was something of a fissure between the Bretton Woods twins, as the 
World Bank under the leadership of Stiglitz and Managing Director Paul 
Wolfensohn sought to move away from this agenda. The result was the 
emergence of the Post-Washington consensus development paradigm, 
which was symbolically dominated by the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goal of ‘Poverty Reduction’.  The IMF, gradually and 
perhaps reluctantly, began its own review of conditionality under the new 
Managing Director Horst Köhler in 2001/2 in an attempt to offset 
criticism. 
Despite these reforms, during the 2000s the IMF lost considerable policy 
leverage and significance. Relatively strong and protracted growth in the 
global economy, combined with the attempts of many emerging and 
developing countries to build up their reserves precisely to avoid the 
need for future IMF ‘support’ in the wake of the Asian crisis and 
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response, meant that programme lending, and the number of countries 
supported, fell dramatically (Bird & Rowlands 2010: 1280). A range of 
commentators, including the then Managing Director Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, questioned the long-term viability of the institution (Kaya 
2012: 24). 
However, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and international 
efforts by the G20 to respond to it, the institution has been rejuvenated. 
The renewal of IMF resources (Bird & Rowlands 2010; Kaya 2012) and 
legitimacy in response to the great financial crisis also necessitated a 
change in geographical emphasis as the Fund initially stepped in to 
support European economies such as Iceland, the Baltic countries and, of 
course, Greece.  At the same time, conditionality and policy advice was 
once again re-packaged in terms that sought to emphasise the Post-
Washington Consensus focus on country ownership, sensitivity to 
contextual features and therefore a less doctrinaire approach (Gabor 
2010), including a new focus on the social effects of economic reform 
(Lütz and Kranke 2014). New arrangements were introduced which 
enabled some countries to borrow through the Flexible Credit Line 
without recourse to explicit conditionality, principally because their 
existing economic policy provided sufficient up-front credibility (Lütz 
and Kranke 2014: 324). 
In this context, a variety of studies have focussed on IMF governance 
reforms (Lesage et al. 2013), lending volumes (Bird & Rowlands 2010), 
the content of loan conditionality (Broome 2015; Gabor 2010; Grabel 
2011; Lütz and Kranke 2014) and its overall policy preferences (Babb 
2013). Opinion differs as to whether Fund conditionality and policy 
advice exhibits essential continuities with neo-liberal preferences for 
monetary stability (Gabor 2010) and fiscal retrenchment (Babb 2013; 
Broome 2015) or emergent change (Lütz and Kranke 2014) in which 
there are opportunities for progressive and heterodox alternatives, 
especially under competition from state ‘forum shopping’ behaviours and 
new alternative sources of external finance (Grabel 2011).  Of particular 
relevance to our paper, Kentikelenis et al. (2016) find that there is 
evidence of rhetorical change but that this masks significant continuity in 
the trajectory of neo-liberalisation, especially in relation to labour market 
and social protection policy. This paper makes a contribution to this 
literature by assessing the extent to which recent high level rhetorical 
policy commitments to reducing inequality are carried through to policy 
advice to member states, whether that be the ‘soft’ policy advice of 
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Article IV commentaries on member state economic policy, or the 
‘harder’ policy advice associated with lending and programme 
conditionality. 
Empirical Methods 
As Broome (2015: 149) notes: ‘Analysing the scope of the IMF’s policy 
advice to borrowers provides a window through which to trace changes 
in the organization’s preferences for national economic policy reforms’.  
Clearly the IMF has a variety of different relationships with its member 
states; it is not a unitary actor (Chwieroth 2009). Several studies show 
that IMF policy advice is often variable between members (Bird & 
Rowlands 2010), and other research has shown that the IMF has more 
leverage with smaller countries (Kaya 2012) and those who borrow from 
the Fund, or whose access to other financing may be dependent on 
favourable IMF commentaries (Broome 2015).  It might be argued that 
the additional leverage between the IMF and borrowing countries (as 
opposed to those simply subject to surveillance under Article IV) 
suggests it is important to focus mainly on these countries.  However, 
given the potential for IMF policy advice to have knock-on effects in 
relation to other financing (Broome 2015: 151), and that it spends the 
majority of time on its surveillance activities (Broome and Seabrooke 
2007) there is merit also in focussing on policy advice to non-borrowing 
members.  Moreover, this also has the advantage of enabling comparison 
in policy advice between borrowing and non-borrowing members. 
Additionally, recent claims by the IMF itself suggest that IMF policy 
advice is increasingly shaped in country-specific ways. If this were true, 
then it would be expected that IMF policy advice in relation to inequality 
would be shaped in part by the degree of inequality (and perhaps also 
change in inequality) within individual member states. 
The presentation of empirical data in the ‘findings’ section follows the 
four stages in the data collection and analysis, as below: 
1. Several of the documents which characterise the IMF’s recent high 
level political commitment to reducing inequality, also include discussion 
of a series of macro-economic and structural policies which are identified 
as increasing or decreasing socio-economic inequality.  This discussion is 
summarised below in order to establish a framework by which the IMF’s 
own commitment to inequality might be tested.  This follows the 
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approach recently used by Broome (2015) to test the IMF’s continuing 
policy commitment to the ‘Washington Consensus’. Broome uses the 
initial proclamation of a Washington Consensus as the source for 
identifying a list of specific policy commitments that is then used to test 
continuity and change in policy advice.  The approach here is to 
summarise the IMF’s own discussion of policies that might 
increase/decrease inequality so that policy advice can be tested to explore 
whether inequality-decreasing measures feature and, conversely, to 
explore whether those policies which might be regarded as increasing 
inequality are absent. The data is taken from three high profile IMF 
policy publications (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; IMF 2014a; Ostry et al. 
2014) on inequality. 
2. IMF staff who produce policy advice for member states work under a 
set of operational guidelines.  An examination of changes in operational 
guidelines provides a method by which to assess the extent to which high 
level commitments to reduce inequality are genuinely held by senior 
figures in the Fund and Executive Directors / influential Member States.  
The revised guidelines are therefore examined to assess the extent to 
which they promote the policies suggested in (1).  Several revisions are 
discussed, the most recent being agreed in 2014 – subsequent to the 
publication of some of the high profile policy publications mentioned in 
(1) and which took effect from June 2015 onwards.  The revised 
guidelines and associated documentation were read critically for all 
references to inequality and distributional discussions. These relevant 
discussions are summarised below. 
3. Examination of recent – that is; subsequent to the publication of high 
level commitments at (1) and changes to operational guidelines at (2) – 
policy advice to member states, including both borrowers and non-
borrowers.  We considered policy advice to eleven countries.  The sample 
size was limited by the number of newly agreed programmes and Article 
IV consultations that had taken place between the implementation of the 
new operational guidelines and April 2016, when we completed the 
empirical research. The sample includes all seven countries that 
completed new programme agreements during that period and a cross 
sample of countries who had undertaken Article IV consultations to 
reflect different domestic conditions and possible relations between the 
Fund and the Country Authorities.  Article IV/Programme documents 
were first keyword searched for references to ‘inequality’, ‘equality’, 
‘distribution’ and then were read in detail.  Particular emphasis was given 
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to the sections which contain the Executive Board assessment and 
commentary, Staff Appraisal, discussions of ‘risk’ and the Country 
Authorities’ own comments. Comparison of these might illuminate, for 
example, differences or similarities of emphasis between the priorities of 
the EB, operational staff and country authorities.  The documents were 
also read to identify what proportion of the policies to reduce inequality 
in high profile documents (1) appear, especially when compared to the 
standard prescription of fiscal discipline.  The results of this are 
summarised in Figures 2-4 and the relevant discussion below. 
4. Even if operational guidelines have been changed to reflect a new 
commitment to reduce inequality and recent policy advice also reflects 
the mix of policies identified by the Fund as reducing inequality, it could 
be suggested that there is no real change in policy advice. This might be 
the case if policy advice had always reflected this concern. This is 
important to investigate, on the grounds that prior interview data and 
IMF documents suggest that a concern with the effects on inequality of 
IMF policy advice have to some extent shaped operational policy with 
member states since the 1980s (IMF 2014a: 5; Nunn 2015).  Analysis of 
change over time within the advice offered to those member states 
included in the sample at (3) offers one way of assessing this claim on its 
own terms, but also the related issue of whether there is any specific 
recent change.  As such, for countries in the sample, we also repeated the 
exercise at (3) for the immediately prior Article IV consultation or 
Programme Reviews, where relevant. 
Findings: high level policy rhetoric, changing operational 
guidelines and recent policy advice to member states 
The Fund’s Recent High Profile Statements on Inequality 
Several recent papers from the IMF discuss the links between policy and 
inequality (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; IMF 2014a; Ostry et al. 2014).  IMF 
(2014a) shows that redistributive fiscal policy in advanced countries 
typically offsets around a third of market or original income inequality, 
that this redistribution is often effective over the life course rather than 
between wealthy and poor households per se, and that the effects of this 
redistribution have weakened as market inequality has grown.  The paper 
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distinguishes between policies in ‘Advanced’ and ‘Developing’ 
economies.  In advanced economies the report argues that there is 
persuasive evidence that “fiscal policy has played a significant role in 
reducing income inequalities”, particularly in relation to welfare and 
pension transfers (15).  This then leads to the rather obvious conclusion 
that progressive income tax and redistributory social policy spending can 
reduce inequality. Two further high level considerations are suggested in 
relation to fiscal policy.  Corporate taxation is regarded with some 
scepticism as it is argued that the scope for capital mobility means that 
the burden of corporate taxation is effectively passed on to less mobile 
labour. In addition, indirect taxation and spending are regarded 
differently; with the former being regressive and the latter being more 
progressive. In relation to developing economies the report suggests that 
the redistributory effects of fiscal policy are often limited because of the 
generally low levels of tax and spending on social programmes and 
transfers. The report also notes some of the complexities of fiscal policy, 
and social spending in particular, in developing countries; with the 
equality effects of in-kind transfers such as public services being strongly 
dependent on detailed issues of policy design and accessibility.  The 
report then goes on to arrive at a list of 18 policies that might result in 
beneficial redistribution in advanced economies and 21 policies (some 
overlap) which might have similar effects in terms of developing 
countries (see Figure 1).  
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) undertake a simple analysis of within country 
variation in inequality, focussing on the contribution of a number of 
factors drawn from the wider literature which might be thought to impact 
on inequality.  The analysis suggests that overall labour market flexibility 
has the broadest impact on increasing inequality, followed by financial 
deepening, technological change and financial openness. The 
contribution of increasing pay returns to skills, financial globalisation, 
technological change and financial deepening was reported as different 
for advanced and emerging market economies.  Turning this analysis into 
policy advice, they suggest that country specific approaches are clearly 
most appropriate, but that fiscal policy can promote effective 
redistribution that does not have to harm growth; that education policies 
to facilitate adjustment to technological change and financial inclusion 
can all help reduce inequality. Active Labour Market Policies are also 
recommended for advanced economies, as is reducing informality for 
emerging market economies. 
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Figure 1: Policies to Reduce Inequality Identified by the IMF 




Improve fiscal sustainability of existing 
pension systems – increasing retirement ages 
X X 
Tighten link between social contributions and 
receipts 
 X 
Expand non-contributory means-tested 
pensions 
 X 
Expand means-testing of family benefits and 
strengthen work incentives 
 X 
Intensify use of ALMPs and in work benefits 
to promote transitions 
X  
Develop unemployment savings accounts X  
Consolidate social assistance programmes and 
improve targeting 
 X 
Replace general price subsidies with targeted 
transfers 
 X 
Expand conditional cash transfer programmes X X 
Improve design of public works as a safety net 
employment provider with below market 
wages. 
 X 
Improve access to education of low-income 
families 
X X 
Increase private financing of tertiary education X X 
Maintain access of low-income groups to 
essential health services 
X  
Expand coverage of publicly financed basic 
health package 
 X 
Implement progressive Personal Income Tax 
(PIT) rate structures 
X X 
Relieve low-wage earners from tax or social 
contributions 
X  
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Expand coverage of the PIT  X 
Reconsider income tax exemptions, based on 
a critical tax-expenditure review 
X X 
Impose a reasonable PIT exemption threshold  X 
Tax different types of capital income in a 
neutral manner 
X  
Develop more effective taxation of 
multinationals 
X X 
Automatically exchange information 
internationally 
X X 
Utilize better the opportunities for recurrent 
property taxes 
X X 
Examine scope for more effective taxes on 
inheritances and gifts 
X  
Minimize VAT exemptions and special VAT 
rates 
X X 
Set a sufficiently high VAT registration 
threshold 
X X 
Use specific excises mainly for purposes other 
than redistribution 
X X 
Policies which might increase inequality   
Fiscal consolidation – but possible to 
minimize by balancing spending cuts with tax 
increases, ensuring progressivity and targeting 
distributional effects 
  
Reduced labour market regulation X X 
Decline of organized labour X X 
Rising income premium to higher skills. X X 
Source: IMF 2014a, except the final three lines which are from Dabla-Norris et 
al. 2015. 
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The purpose of summarising these policies here is not so much to subject 
them to critique or alternative interpretation of their impact on inequality, 
but to draw out a list (see Figure 1) of what the IMF itself advocates in 
terms of policies that might reduce inequality. While these are discussed 
in terms that stress their connection to fiscal policy, the recommendations 
are much broader, straying into areas of social and labour market policy.  
These recommended policies to reduce inequality can now be used to 
assess the extent to which IMF operational guidelines for staff, and the 
policy advice that those staff and the Executive Board recommend to 
member states, reflect policies that the IMF itself suggests result in either 
reductions or increases in inequality. 
Changing Operational Guidelines Since 2011 
When working with member states, IMF staff are guided by a series of 
operational guidelines. There are separate procedures for the conduct of 
surveillance activities and programmes with borrower countries. This 
section documents the evolution of these two sets of procedures.  The 
purpose of this discussion is four-fold: (1) to evaluate how far changes to 
these guidelines have taken on board the apparent new focus on 
inequality; (2) the extent to which these considerations have been present 
over time; (3) the leeway that the Operational Guidance offers staff to 
interpret the guidance independently; and (4) to meet country specific 
dynamics, including the extent of, and change in, the degree of inequality 
in individual member states. 
The processes for surveillance activities are subject to regular reviews, 
most recently in 2011 and 2014.  The 2011 review was undertaken in the 
context of the global financial crisis.  A prominent concern was the way 
that IMF surveillance had failed to effectively address global imbalances, 
which, figures connected with the fund were by then suggesting, were 
central to the cause of the crisis and future vulnerabilities (e.g. Rajan 
2011).  The review therefore focussed on inter-connectedness and 
weaknesses in IMF surveillance of state policies, especially larger 
countries who are both more systemically significant and with whom the 
Fund has less leverage (for e.g. see Stiglitz 2011). The resulting changes 
clearly prioritised international financial stability and strengthened the 
risk assessment procedures included in Article IV surveillance (IMF 
2012b) but did also mandate surveillance activities to be guided by 
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member states’ own economic policy objectives and “take into account 
the member’s other objectives and shall respect its domestic social and 
political policies” (IMF 2012a: 8).   
The 2014 review of surveillance activities was still conducted in the 
lengthening shadow of the ongoing crisis and continued to focus on the 
importance of domestic policies for overall systemic stability. It was 
noted that the relationship between structural policies and macro-
economic stability was significant and that this required greater 
cooperation with other multi-lateral organisations such as the ILO, 
OECD and World Bank. It is also interesting that in contrast to some 
recent academic research which found that post-crisis IMF Policy Advice 
in borrowing countries had narrowed (Broome 2015), member states 
wanted a broader focus on structural policy in Article IV surveillance, 
including social protection and labour market policy (IMF 2014c).  The 
Managing Director’s Action Plan arising from the 2014 review 
recommended that labour market policy in particular should be more 
prominent in IMF surveillance reports “reflecting the shared challenge of 
achieving more durable, job-rich and inclusive growth” (IMF 2014d: 6).  
While the Action Plan does suggest that guidance on Article IV 
Surveillance missions will be updated and that this will support the link 
between structural policies and macro-economic risk reduction in IMF 
policy advice, inequality is not mentioned in the review.  This was 
despite the Review concluding at about the same time as the Managing 
Director’s Global Policy Agenda which identified inequality as one of a 
number of structural issues which threatened stability. 
The Operational Guidelines which shape policy advice to borrowing 
countries have also gone through various phases of reform, the most 
recent becoming operational in June 2015. The IMF’s guidelines on 
conditionality were reviewed in 2002 and 2009, and then guidance on the 
operational interpretation and application of these guidelines was 
reviewed in 2011-12 and new guidance (effectively guidance on the 
guidance) was issued in 2014. The 2002 review was set against the 
criticism of the Fund’s handling of the Asian Crisis and the wider 
criticism then apparent of globalisation and international institutions. The 
intention was to streamline conditionality, narrowing the scope of IMF 
policy advice to focus only on the core competences of the Fund (IMF 
2002).  That said, many commentators – and the IMF evaluation office– 
concluded (in 2007) that in practice the scope for staff discretion meant 
that conditionality remained broad (Best 2012).  In the light of the 2008 
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crisis, the IMF has reviewed practices in relation to conditionality on 
several occasions. The 2009 review was undertaken in the context of 
broadening the number and type of programmes offered by the Fund to 
enhance crisis management capacities – particularly the introduction of 
the Flexible Credit Line and Precautionary and Liquidity Line, both of 
which required revised conditionality arrangements to enable ‘ex ante’ 
conditionality based on prior policy performance.  A further review in 
2012 looked at the use of conditionality since the 2007 IEO report and 
resulted in the introduction of new guidance on the application of 
conditionality in 2014. The Revised Operational Guidelines to IMF Staff 
on the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines, makes very little reference to 
concerns with distribution or inequality.  Indeed, the word ‘(in)equality’ 
does not feature in the document and distributional issues are mentioned 
explicitly only once: 
in helping the authorities to design a Fund-supported program, staff 
should (i) seek the views of country authorities early and make every 
effort to accommodate their preferences and policy choices—
including on growth, labor market and distributional targets—where 
possible, subject to consistency with resolving balance–of-payments 
problems, macroeconomic stability, and all other program goals—and 
(ii) follow program preparation and review processes that can 
facilitate reflection on the links between program goals, strategies, and 
conditionality (IMF 2014b: 6; emphasis added). 
Here the reference is to ‘jobs and growth’ or ‘macro-social issues’.  
Footnotes say that the guidance should be read in conjunction with the 
‘Guidance note’ on Jobs and Growth: Issues in Surveillance and 
Program Work (IMF 2013b) which in turn offers staff guidance on the 
conclusions from an Executive Board paper on Jobs and Growth: 
Analytical and Operational Considerations for the Fund (IMF 2013a).   
IMF staff seeking information on how to adopt the high level focus on 
inequality in their work with borrowers must first read the 2014 guidance 
on the 2002 guidance, and then follow a footnote to a separate document 
which itself must be read alongside a separate document summarising the 
concerns. This contradicts the image of inequality as ‘the defining 
challenge of our time’.   
Turning to the content of these documents, the guidance note suggests 
that Fund staff should improve policy advice in a number of areas, e.g.:  
More systematic integration of policy advice on reforms of tax and 
expenditure policy to encourage (i) higher labor force participation, 
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including by women; (ii) stronger job creation; (iii) progress in 
reducing inequalities in income distribution; and (iv) more effective 
protection for the most vulnerable (1). 
However, the guidance note quickly suggests that there may be trade-offs 
between growth, jobs and a more equal income distribution and where 
this is the case, ‘staff’s policy advice in surveillance and program 
contexts should generally prioritize growth’ (3) and ‘…When 
recommending measures to support a more equal income distribution, 
staff and policy makers need to be mindful about preserving the 
incentives that underpin individuals’ willingness to expend effort…’ (4).   
So while inequality is accepted as a potential challenge to growth, the 
guidance is clear that this is a secondary and subordinate consideration. 
The mandate of Fund staff should be interpreted as remaining consistent 
with the objective of increasing and sustaining growth and macro-
economic stability. There is considerable discussion of inequality but 
some of it appears much less certain about the benefits of reducing 
inequality than the high level documents discussed above.  Staff are 
advised to include consideration of inequality and income distribution 
issues in relation to their initial discussions with national authorities in 
both surveillance and programme discussions. However, income 
distribution issues are frequently discussed in ways that question the 
evidence of the links between inequality and growth.   
Further, policies are recommended which in the wider research are 
argued to increase inequality. For example, the guidance recommends 
putting downward pressure on wages across the economy; using public 
sector pay containment to suppress wages in the private sector. Similarly, 
the guidance suggests that ‘Income taxes and social contributions have 
the most adverse effects on growth’ (20); contradicting the policy 
recommendations on inequality cited above. Elsewhere in the document 
a more nuanced picture is presented about the design of fiscal policy, 
recommending greater progressivity in income tax and targeting of social 
transfers. All that said, the message is substantively consistent: inequality 
can reduce growth; redistribution might be positive for growth; 
promoting employment is to be encouraged while containing wage 
growth and ensuring that poverty at the bottom of the distribution does 
not lead to counter-productive (to growth) behaviour among the poor. 
Overall, in the staff guidance the commitment to reducing inequality is 
certainly less clear cut than that suggested in high profile speeches and 
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policy publications, and is clearly secondary to concerns with growth 
and/or fiscal discipline. 
IMF Policy Advice to Member States Since the Change in Operational 
Guidelines 
The policies listed in Figure 1 are used in this section as a means of 
establishing the extent to which policy advice to member states reflect 
the high profile commitment to reducing inequality. If IMF policy advice 
produced since the change in operational guidance (effective from June 
2015) appears to promote policies which it recommends as reducing 
inequality, then we will have some greater evidence on which to 
conclude that the recent high level commitment goes beyond rhetoric.  
Conversely, if we find that IMF policy advice contains policies which it 
regards as increasing inequality and that inequality reducing policies are 
absent, then there is some evidence to support the opposite conclusion. 
We undertook a review of policy advice to different member states who 
have concluded Article IV or programme negotiations with the IMF since 
the change in operational guidelines discussed above. While the limited 
passage of time since the change in operational guidelines constrains the 
size of the possible sample of countries, we have so far been able to 
review policy advice to eleven countries (as set out in Figure 2).   
The sample of borrowing countries covers all seven member states who 
had concluded new borrowing arrangements with the Fund between the 
change in operational guidelines becoming effective and the time of 
writing in early May 2016.  There was more choice among surveillance 
countries because of the greater regularity of Article IV reviews. The 
countries chosen: the United States, United Kingdom, Brazil and China, 
reflect a range of different countries (including advanced/developing) but 
all have relatively high levels of inequality and all are arguably of 
systemic significance.  Between surveillance and borrower countries in 
the sample, there is clear variety in the capacity and power relative to the 
IMF. While it is sensible to think that policy advice is likely to have more 
traction with smaller countries and borrowers, whether or not the policies 
are implemented is not necessarily a measure of how genuine the IMF’s 
commitment to reducing inequality is. As such, the full sample can be 
read on an equivalent basis when addressing that element of the research.

 
Figure 2: Sample of IMF Lending to Programme Countries since June 2015 






























Amount (000s, SDRs) 709,259 
354,629 
3,870,000 147,500 4,440 17,040 204,480 
HDR Indicator/Ranking 0.548/145 0.720/97 N/A 0.555/143 0.720/178 0.416/180 
GDP Per Capita (USD), 













Poverty Rate MDG  43.4% 5.6% N/A 43.5% 48.9% 60.7% 
Debt as % GDP (Gross, 
from IMF Prog. docs)  
48.1  44.3 (2014) 16.7 (2014) 74.5 (2014) 49.8 (2013) 56.6 (2014) 
Source: IMF 2016, IMF Lending Arrangements as of March 31 
2016 http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr11.aspx?memberKey1=ZZZZ&date1key=2020-02-28.
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The policy discussion and advice in these documents is revealing.  
Relatively little discussion of inequality concerns is present in any of 
them (see Figure 3 and Annex I).  Where it is present, this is usually in 
very passing references.  Inequality also appears to be more likely to be 
discussed in Article IV papers than in programme reviews.  One possible 
explanation for this might be that this reflects the policy preferences of 
country authorities and their greater ability to press for their own 
domestic objectives to be reflected. Where inequality is mentioned in 
these documents, this is mainly in passing and some surprising 
commentaries are present, again suggesting that the references are there 
at the behest of country authorities.  For example, positive comments are 
made about reductions in inequality in Brazil, despite it having a very 
high level of inequality and recently witnessing urban unrest related to 
inequality.  Similarly, the UK government is praised for monitoring the 
distributional effects of austerity policies, though prevailing domestic 
opinion on UK austerity would be somewhat more critical of the 
distributional effects themselves as opposed to mere measurement 
activity. No mention is made whatsoever of inequality in China, though 
the impressive economic growth of recent decades is widely noted to 
have realised rapidly increasing inequality, raising the prospect of social 
tension.  Indeed, the only place in the Article IV report where inequality 
is mentioned is by the Chinese Executive Director who comments on 
urban-rural divides, but not on new urban inequalities, the plight of 
migrant workers in urban environments or industrial tensions around 
wage repression. 
The absence of discussion about distributional issues may reflect Fund 
staff staying closer to their specific brief of exchange rate, monetary and 
fiscal policy than the more expansive policy advice dispensed in previous 
times, but it also suggests that inequality is at best a second order 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Discussion of Inequality in Article IV 
Documents in Surveillance Countries 
 Article IV Papers 
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Looking at the policies recommended (see Annex II) is also revealing. 
The country where recommended policies fit most closely with the 
outline of policies prescribed for inequality reduction is the US. It may 
well be that this reflects more the views of the national authorities than 
the Fund itself.  Outside of this, the policies suggested are much less 
frequently present in those recommended to member states. Indeed, 
while the traditional recipe of fiscal consolidation is recommended in all 
countries in the sample, very few of those policies that the IMF 
recommend to reduce inequality (see Annex II) are mentioned at all. 
Where these policies are recommended to borrower countries, the most 
prominent could also be interpreted as being concerned as much with 
fiscal consolidation as reducing inequality (‘consolidate social 
programmes and improved targeting’) and also reflect the clearly growth-
oriented concern to ‘expand educational enrolment’ (a commitment that 
was part of the Millennium Development Goals for more than 15 years 
now in any case). Add to this, the frequent exhortations to reform social 
programmes to contain state spending and to supress wage growth, and 
the reader is left wondering what, if any, change in priorities there has 
been as a result of the fanfare over the Fund’s new high profile 
commitment to reducing inequality. 
That said, there is some evidence that the very limited prominence of 
inequality in recent IMF Programme documents represents slow progress 
in increasing the systemic consideration given to inequality in the Fund’s 
work with member states.  When comparing with the immediately prior 
programme documentation for borrower countries it was clear that 
inequality had been even less of a concern prior to the change in 
operational guidelines. It is perhaps too early to conclude definitively, but 
this might suggest that there are marginal signs of a slow and limited 
change in emphasis. 
Discussion: the significance of IMF policy advice on 
inequality  
There are many different perspectives on the work of international 
organisations, and the IMF has been perhaps both one of the most studied 
and most criticised. The early commentary on international organisations 
like the IMF in critical IPE tended to take the line that these 
organisations were part of the establishment of a quasi-constitutional 
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neo-liberal institutional structure above the state which sought processes 
of ‘lock-in’ through their institutionalised linkages with member states 
(Gill 1998).  Other materialist scholars have associated the institutions of 
global economic management with a project to expand the world market, 
attempting also to solve problems attendant to that project (Cammack 
2001 2004).  In that critique, the turn to the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ 
in the early 2000s represented a recognition of the risks and problems 
associated with markets and market failure, and a corresponding attempt 
to cope with these (Cammack 2009, 2012).  
More recently a range of broadly critical but more constructivist 
scholarship has sought to show how the ways in which international 
organisations like the IMF construct their ‘cognitive authority’ is crucial 
to understanding their attempts, successes and failures to secure the 
implementation of their policy advice within member states (Broome and 
Seabrooke 2007, 2012).   
One similar line of discussion in this tradition and which is relevant to 
our paper is the ‘organised hypocrisy’ thesis developed by Weaver (2009) 
and others (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). Weaver’s work, which focuses 
upon the activities of the World Bank, highlights ‘mainstreaming gaps’, 
or discrepancies between what the Bank claims are its priorities 
(alleviation of poverty and socioeconomic development) and what it 
actually does to pursue these goals, resulting in ‘organised hypocrisy’. 
Such an analysis might explain our own findings and the discrepancy 
between high level pronouncements and the structure and content of 
policy advice. This might arise especially from the tensions between 
environmentally influenced goals (such as the recognition that high 
levels of inequality are systemically destabilising) and the internal 
organisational culture, with its entrenched ideologies, norms, and 
standard operating procedures. Indeed, Gronau and Schmidtke (2016) 
apply similar arguments to the IMF. They argue that the IMF is 
undergoing a 'legitimacy crisis' flowing from the negative consequences 
of loan conditionality for employment, poverty, and social stability. They 
go on to argue that the IMF’s ‘public legitimation strategies’, which 
emphasise poverty reduction, social security, and democratic 
participation, are seen by IMF staff as being in conflict with the Fund’s 
identity and purpose, and constituting an inappropriate expansion of the 
IMF’s mandate towards more political issues. This tension between the 
externally influenced ‘legitimisation strategy’ publically adopted by the 
IMF and the organisation’s strongly entrenched internal bureaucratic 
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culture could lead to a situation of ‘organised hypocrisy’ similar to that 
identified by Weaver in the World Bank. Similarly, a recent paper by 
Kentikelenis et al. (2016) suggests that ‘organised hypocrisy’ explains 
the difference between IMF rhetoric and the content of policy 
conditionality and advice. This would help to explain our own findings 
and provide an insight into the root causes of the disconnect between the 
IMF's high level pronouncements on reducing inequality and the far 
more limited practical action taken to that end. 
Here the attention is much less on the macro-global policy frameworks 
that they deploy and more on the inner workings of international 
organisations themselves and the means by which particular policy 
paradigms are transferred from international organisations into member 
state policy. In this latter conception, it is a mistake to identify simplistic 
patterns of coherence between international organisations or simple 
policy convergence within member states at their hands. That said, these 
scholars do see important processes by which international organisations 
mobilise indirect ideational power, leading to policy changes within their 
member states. 
The central theme of this paper cuts across these different perspectives. 
That several international organisations have adopted both the concern 
with systemic risk management and the perception of inequality now 
being a ‘negative risk’ (Cammack 2012; Nunn 2015) in systemic terms, 
is, of course, notable itself.  But to make sense of this, it is necessary not 
just to enquire about the internal processes by which inequality came to 
be framed as a policy problem.  Rather it is necessary to enquire into the 
specific historical conjuncture; the material processes and social 
struggles within which this has occurred. The organised hypocrisy thesis 
might help explain the gap between the Fund’s rhetoric and practice. A 
‘soft’ interpretation of the rhetoric/practice gap might merely be that the 
rhetoric helps to offset criticism and provide legitimation for a continued 
commitment to neo-liberalisation.  However, while we cannot fully 
substantiate this claim, we are tempted to go further.  It may be no 
accident that leading IOs have come to worry about managing global 
risks.  The current conjuncture is one at which systemic risks are 
becoming more prominent precisely because the system is reaching its 
spatial, social and ecological limits. If risks cannot be offset through 
deferring them in time and space, then they are likely to become 
amplified (Jessop 2015).  As Cammack (2014, 2015) persuasively argues, 
the current point in the history of capitalism as a world system is marked 
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by the proximity – if not yet the reality – of the completion of the world 
market, at which point that system may become more unstable and crisis 
prone, requiring more than mere rhetorical legitimation.  A ‘harder’ 
interpretation therefore might be that the commitment to manage these 
risks is genuine – more than rhetoric – but that there are institutional 
barriers to this being adopted in relation to policy and practice 
implementation. 
With this context in place the explanatory problem then shifts to 
precisely how inequality might be ‘framed’ as a material and systemic 
problem. Here the constructivist literature with its emphasis on the way 
that international organisations seek to diffuse policy ideas can help.  The 
discussion of inequality in key IMF strategic policy publications has a 
heavy reliance on research papers produced by IMF staffers as well as 
research by the World Bank and particularly the OECD, which has 
arguably led the way among international organisations on this issue. It is 
notable then that the Fund is only one of a number of organisations, 
including less formal agenda setting elite forums such as the World 
Economic Forum, to be now legitimating and framing inequality as a 
policy problem from the perspective of promoting and sustaining world 
market integration. Interview data with Fund staff suggests that though 
emergent, this framing represents a genuine commitment to reduce 
inequality rather than being mere rhetorical legitimation. 
However, it seems that this policy problem has not fully diffused through 
the institutional structure.  Inequality is less clearly seen as a problem 
either in the evolving operational guidelines for IMF staff or the policy 
advice administered to member states. Moreover, where it features at all 
at these more operational scales, inequality appears to be subordinate to 
concerns with growth and fiscal consolidation.  Institutional barriers and 
internal struggles might have been important in blocking the transfer of 
the high level rhetorical commitment from translating into policy advice 
to member states. Indeed, this might be no particular surprise. It may be 
that the commitment of the MD and senior staff has yet to be taken up by 
the professional economists who dispense policy advice to member states 
through Article IV and programme discussions. Best (2012) notes that 
previous changes to operational guidelines have sometimes been resisted 
by staff who are uncomfortable with stepping beyond the boundaries of 
their professional training.  Not only do many of the inequality-reducing 
policies lie outside of the Fund’s traditional competences in relation to 
fiscal and monetary policy, but also, as one senior IMF official suggested 
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to us in an interview, the recent high level commitment to reducing 
inequality ‘breaks one of the ten truths that all economists know’. Such 
ideational and institutional barriers to reorientation may both mean that 
any change of emphasis in policy advice regarding inequality will be 
slow, and that the Fund’s capacity to act as a systemic risk manager in the 
decades to come is significantly constrained by such internal rigidities. 
While not explicitly intended to achieve this, the evidence above might 
also contribute to some of the wider debates on IMF policy advice in the 
contemporary literature. It suggests that there may once again be some 
broadening of the IMF’s policy advice, counteracting the narrowing of 
Fund advice over the last decade (Broome 2015). The policies 
recommended by the Fund to reduce inequality stray far outside of fiscal 
and monetary policy.  They also suggest the promotion of a more 
sophisticated policy agenda of neo-liberalisation akin to the hybrid and 
context sensitive interpretation offered by Brenner et al. (2010), than the 
more simplistic ‘Washington Consensus’ prescriptions.  Following this, 
the way that the discussion of inequality occurs in borrower and non-
borrower policy advice also suggests that there is scope for flexibility, 
ownership and influence of IMF policy advice by country authorities, 
especially among more powerful non-borrowers. 
Conclusions 
The paper addresses a largely empirical question related to the IMF’s 
recent high profile statements on the importance of reducing inequality. 
These are somewhat at odds with the Fund’s hitherto reputation as an 
organization that is unconcerned with inequality and committed to a 
reform agenda of neo-liberalisation. Indeed, it might easily be argued that 
policies that the Fund has previously recommended have contributed to 
the increased inequality that it now, apparently, sees as a problem. As 
such, it is interesting to explore how significant the espoused 
commitment to reducing inequality actually is, by assessing the extent to 
which this commitment is reflected in recent changes in operational 
guidelines and the policy advice given to member countries.  The data 
collected here suggests that the concerns expressed in high profile policy 
statements are not wholly carried through to operational guidelines and 
practice. Given the long-term connection of the IMF with neo-
liberalisation, this is perhaps unsurprising. 
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While this series of steps in the collection and analysis of data is able to 
explore how genuine is the IMF’s commitment to the ‘new politics of 
inequality’, a number of important limitations remain. First, we cannot 
fully explain why there is an apparently greater commitment to reducing 
inequality at a strategic policy scale and a much more muted 
commitment at more operational scales.  Instead, we are limited to 
offering possible explanations related to organised hypocrisy, internal 
struggle and institutional inertia. Second, we cannot assess the extent to 
which this policy commitment – to the extent that it exists – is actually 
implemented in practice by member states themselves. Third, we are not 
able to assess whether non-implementation reflects ‘policy slippage’ or 
merely tacit and unwritten arrangements between the Fund and member 
states that some policy commitments should be taken more seriously than 
others, regardless of what is written in programme documents. Since 
IMF policy advice has been interpreted as sometimes opaque and 
informal (Best 2012), this may be significant.  Further research should 
therefore address these limitations.   
Several avenues for future research are suggested by this analysis. The 
sample of borrower countries involved in the type of analysis of policy 
advice conducted here should be broadened. Change over time should be 
considered in the process as the new operational guidelines bed in.  
Further, at least two lines of enquiry for interview-based research are 
suggested by the discussion.  First, it would be useful to explore why the 
reviews of operational guidelines were not more fully shaped by the high 
level policy pronouncements on inequality. Second, it would be useful to 
explore why Article IV reports and Programme Agreements and reviews 
act on or ignore the guidance on inequality that is present in these 
guidelines. This would involve discussions with EB members, IMF staff 
and Country Authorities in relation to a sample of Article IV and 
Programme negotiations.  
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 Annex II: Policies Recommended to Sample Borrower Countries  












Improve fiscal sustainability 
of existing pension systems – 
increasing retirement ages 
X X  X *    
Tighten link between social 
contributions and receipts 
 X      
Expand non-contributory 
means-tested pensions 
 X X     
Expand means-testing of 
family benefits and 
strengthen work incentives 
 X      
Foster transitions through 
intensifying ALMPs and in-
X       
                                                 
* No cut to retirement age – but cuts to pension benefits and beneficiaries  
 
work benefits  
Develop unemployment 
savings accounts 
X       
Consolidate social assistance 
programmes and improve 
targeting 
 X X X X X X 
Replace general price 
subsidies with targeted 
transfers 
 X      
Expand conditional cash 
transfer programmes 
X X      
Improve design of public 
works as a safety net 
employment provider with 
below market wages. 
 X      
Improve access to education 
of low-income families 
X X X X X X  
Increase private financing of 
tertiary education 
X X      
Maintain access of low- X    X X  
 
income groups to essential 
health services 
Expand coverage of publicly 
financed basic health package 
 X      
Implement progressive 
Personal Income Tax (PIT) 
rate structures 
X X      
Relieve low-wage earners 
from tax or social 
contributions 
X       
Expand coverage of the PIT  X      
Reconsider income tax 
exemptions, based on a 
critical tax-expenditure 
review 
X X    X  
Impose a reasonable PIT 
exemption threshold 
 X      
Tax different types of capital 
income in a neutral manner 
X       
Develop more effective X X   X   
 
taxation of multinationals 
Automatically exchange 
information internationally 
X X      
Utilize better the 
opportunities for recurrent 
property taxes 
X X      
Examine scope for more 
effective taxes on 
inheritances and gifts 
X       
Minimize VAT exemptions 
and special VAT rates 
X X  X X**   
Set a sufficiently high VAT 
registration threshold 
X X      
Use specific excises mainly 
for purposes other than 
redistribution 
X X      
  
                                                 
** Introduction of VAT system for first time.  
 












Fiscal consolidation, but 
possible to minimize by 
balancing spending cuts 
with tax increases, 
ensuring progressivity and 
targeting distributional 
effects 
  X X  X X X 
Reduced labour market 
regulation 
X X      
Decline of organized 
labour 
X X      
Rising income premium to 
higher skills 
X X      
Sources: As in Figure 3 and Annex I. 
